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BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVES:  
FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE BETWEEN SOFT AND HARD LAW 
 
Abstract 
In the wake of increasing corporate disasters, there has been an urgent need to address business 
impacts on human rights.  Yet business responsibilities for human rights are mainly voluntary 
and likely best termed ‘soft law’. Recently, however, several states have begun negotiations 
for an international binding treaty in this area suggesting a need to turn to ‘hard law’ to increase 
the efficacy of business and human rights (BHR) initiatives.  This article argues that because 
soft and hard law concepts are not dichotomous, BHR governance need not become ‘hard law’ 
to be effective. Rather ‘hardened’ soft law instruments can be equally effective. 
Key words:  International Law, Business and Human Rights, Soft Law, Globalization, 
Supply Chains 
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BUSINESS AND HUMAN RIGHTS INITIATIVES:  
FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE BETWEEN SOFT AND HARD LAW 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Today, business and human rights (BHR) issues permeate some of the most pressing problems 
faced both by governments and business. These range from economic inequality1 to the 
protection of human rights in free trade deals2 to supply chain matters.3 The importance of the 
need to protect BHR issues has also been highlighted in recent scandals such as the collapse of 
a garment factory in Bangladesh4 or the large number of employee suicides in one of Apple’s 
largest suppliers in China.5   Indeed, the idea of business and human rights as encompassing 
two disparate systems that operate in isolation from one another is gradually being rejected by 
both governments and business. BHR issues are now viewed as a predicament that must be 
addressed. 
Yet despite the growing recognition of the importance for business to address human 
rights issues, responsibilities for companies in this area are mainly situated at the voluntary 
level.  Corporate BHR responsibilities are thus rarely framed in mandatory language and 
enforcement of these voluntary responsibilities also tends to be weak or non-existent.  For that 
reason, BHR corporate responsibilities are likely best characterized as ‘soft’ law. 
Recently, however, there have been attempts to ‘harden’ BHR responsibilities; that is 
moved in the direction of mandatory from voluntary. Several states are in the midst of 
negotiating a binding BHR treaty, which, upon completion, would impose legally binding 
                                                 
1T. May, ‘We can make Britain a country that works for everyone’ (11 July 2016). 
2 United Nations, ‘UN experts voice concern over adverse impact of free trade and investment agreements on 
human rights’ (2 Jun 2015). 
3 M. Mason et al., ‘Shrimp sold by global supermarkets is peeled by slave labourers in Thailand’ The Guardian 
(14 December 2015). 
4 J.A. Manik and J. Yardley, ‘Building Collapse in Bangladesh Leaves Scores Dead’ New York Times (24 April 
2013). 
5 J. Chan et al., ‘Dying for an iPhone: the lives of Chinese workers’ ChinaDialogue (15 Apr 2016). 
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human rights obligations on multinational companies.6  Efforts have also been made at the 
domestic level to harden BHR responsibilities. While binding legal obligations certainly bring 
clarity and enforceability to business responsibilities in this area, businesses have frequently 
opposed such initiatives. In fact, predecessor efforts to impose mandatory BHR obligations on 
businesses met with such resistance that the initiatives had to be abandoned altogether.7   
Against this background, this article questions whether BHR initiatives which outline 
the responsibilities of business vis-à-vis human rights need to encompass binding legal 
obligations to be effective.  If the goal of promoting such initiatives is to minimize corporate 
impacts on human rights issues, binding obligations may not be fruitful in an area where 
business acceptance of such initiatives is crucial to their success. Instead, this article argues 
that BHR initiatives that are essentially soft in nature but that are accompanied by 
characteristics of hard law can be equally effective at establishing norms for business 
responsibilities in this area without becoming legalized obligations.   
The article proceeds as follows.  Part I begins by elaborating on the definition and 
differences between the notions of ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ law, finding that the concepts are not 
dichotomous but rather operate on a continuum. It then identifies the leading multilateral BHR 
initiatives and attempts to place them on the soft to hard law continuum.  Having concluded 
that most BHR initiatives are located closer to the soft law end of the continuum, Part II 
discusses whether these initiatives need to become binding legal obligations, drawing from 
examples in other areas of the law. This Part concludes by finding utility in soft law initiatives 
that incorporate characteristics of hard law.  Part III moves to examine how BHR soft law 
initiatives can be hardened, or moved closer from voluntary to mandatory, in order to better 
establish norms in this area and makes suggestions of how to do so.  Finally, in Part IV, the 
                                                 
6 For an overview of this treaty process see B. Choudhury, ‘Spinning Straw into Gold: Incorporating the Business 
and Human Rights Agenda into International Investment Agreements’ (2017) 38:2 U. Penn. J. Int’l.L.101. 
7 I. Bantekas, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility in International Law’ (2004) 22 B.U. Int’l L.J. 309, 319. 
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article examines the circumstances under which BHR issues require binding legal obligations 
in addition to hardened soft law initiatives.  Drawing from legalized approaches both at the 
international and domestic levels, this part explores the scope and limits of designing future 
binding obligations in this area.   
 
I. SOFT AND HARD LAW 
 
A. Distinguishing Between Soft and Hard Law 
 
In assessing the nature of BHR initiatives, it is useful to begin with a definition of both soft and 
hard law. Whereas hard law is generally thought to consist of legally binding obligations that 
create enforceable rights and duties,8 soft law does not have a universally accepted definition.9  
It may refer to “principles, norms, standards or other statements of expected behaviour” that 
do not create enforceable rights and duties.10  Alternatively, it may be defined in the negative; 
that is, as lacking one or more of the properties normally ascribed to law – normative content, 
formal legal status, and enforceability.11 
The lack of a precise definition of soft law has led to speculation as to whether soft and 
hard law are dichotomies12 or whether they simply represent two ends of a continuum, which 
                                                 
8 R. R. Baxter, ‘International Law in ‘Her Infinite Variety”’ (1980) 29 ICLQ 549.   
9 J. Gold, Interpretation: The IMF and International Law (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996), 301; C. 
Brummer, Soft Law and the Global Financial System: Rule Making in the 21st Century (Cambridge: CUP, 2011), 
2. 
10 D. Shelton, ‘Normative Hierarchy in International Law’ (2006) 100 AJIL 291, 319-320; Baxter, n 8 above, 549. 
11 T. Gammeltoft-Hansen et al., ‘Introduction: Tracing the Roles of Soft Law in Human Rights’ in S. Lagoutte et 
al. (eds) Tracing the Roles of Soft Law in Human Rights (Oxford: OUP, 2016), 3. 
12 J. d’Aspremont, ‘Softness in International Law: A Self-Serving Quest for New Legal Materials’ (2009) 19 EJIL 
5; J. Cerone, ‘A Taxonomy of Soft Law: Stipulating a Definition’ in Lagoutte et al., n 11 above, 16-17. 
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ranges from binding legal obligation on one end to “complete freedom of action” on the other.13 
Positivists argue that an instrument is either law or not making the idea of soft law redundant.14   
However, for others, soft law is thought of in terms of a continuum, reflecting variances 
in normativity and behaviour-influencing capacity.  For these commentators, although the legal 
content of soft law can vary, it is still viewed as ‘law’ since the norms found in soft law are 
formulated as rules and are designed to guide behaviour.15  Yet their content remains ‘soft’ in 
terms of their preciseness, ability to be rendered more or less legal at the ex ante negotiation 
stage, enforceability, justiciability, normativity, or their binding nature.16   
The multiplicity of forms soft law can take also support the idea of a soft-hard law 
continuum, rather than distinct categories. Soft law can be found in a breadth of instruments 
including treaties, codes of conduct, voluntary resolutions, joint declarations, ministerial 
conferences, tacit or oral agreements, final communiqués, and statements prepared by non-
governmental organizations purporting to delineate international principles.17 However, it is 
not the form of an instrument that is determinative of its legal status.18 While treaties containing 
precise commitments and specificity of obligations undertaken or rights granted are more 
indicative of hard law,19 treaties that provide for the “gradual acquiring of standards or for 
                                                 
13 Shelton, n 10 above, 320; C.M. Chinkin, ‘Normative Development’ in D. Shelton (ed.), Commitment and 
Compliance: The Role of Non-Binding Norms in the International Legal System (Oxford: OUP, 2003), 37; I. A. 
Olsson, ‘Four competing approaches to international soft law’ (2013) 58 Scandinavian Studies in Law 177, 187. 
14 d’Aspremont, n 12 above; J. Klabbers, ‘The Redundancy of Soft Law’ (1996) Nordic Journal of International 
Law 167; K. Raustiala, ‘Form and Substance in International Agreements’ (2005) 99 AJIL 586; J.L. Goldsmith 
and E.A. Posner, The Limits of International Law (Oxford: OUP, 2005), 81-82; Cerone, n 12 at 16. 
15 Cerone, n 12 at 16. 
16 d’Aspremont, n 12 above,1081-87; J. d’Aspremont, ‘Softness in International Law: A Self-Serving Quest for 
New Legal Materials: A Rejoinder to Tony D’Amato’ (2009) 20 EJIL 911, 914; G.C. Schaffer and M.A. Pollack, 
‘Hard vs. Soft Law: Alternatives, Complements, and Antagonists in International Governance’ (2010) 94 
Minnesota L. Rev. 706, 716; W. M. Reisman, ‘A Hard Look at Soft Law’ (1988) 82 ASIL Proceedings 373; W. 
M. Reisman, ‘Soft Law and Law Jobs’ (2011) 2:1 J. of Int’l. Dispute Settlement 25. 
17 C.M. Chinkin ‘The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in International Law’ (1989) 38 ICLQ 
850, 851; Klabbers, n 14 above, 168; Olsson, n 13 above, 180-185. 
18 d’Amato and K. Engel (eds) International Environmental Law Anthology (Cincinnati: Anderson Publishing 
Company, 1996), 56-57. 
19 Chinkin, n 17 above, 851; K.W. Abbott and D. Snidal, ‘Hard and Soft Law in International Governance’ (2000) 
54(3) Int’l. Org. 421. 
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general goals and programmed action” are seen as soft and devoid of legal content.20 In 
addition, delegation to a third party for interpretation of the instrument can define where on the 
continuum a particular instrument lies.21   
Discerning whether an area is soft or hard law may also be facilitated by examining the 
legal consequences that must necessarily follow from performance or breach of that area. 
Where the legal consequences – of both performance and breach – can be ascertained with 
precision, only then can an area be considered to have hardened.22 Consequently, soft law 
norms are more likely to be characterized by vague or uncertain outcomes flowing from either 
the performance or breach of that norm. 
Finally, the authority of the instrument drafter may play a role in determining its hard 
or soft law status.  Signals of authority emanating from the drafters can clarify whether an 
instrument is law or whether it represents only “statements in the subjunctive mood”.23 For 
example, resolutions emanating from the UN Security Council relating to the maintenance of 
peace are clearly an indicator of firm authority, whereas UN General Assembly handlings of 
matters not assigned to it are more indicative of soft authority.24  In other words, soft law is 
more likely to be evident when the drafter of the instrument possesses little or no authority. 
B. Characterizing BHR initiatives 
 
Having distinguished between soft and hard law and delineated arguments in support of a 
continuum view of soft and hard law, this part moves to discuss how the leading international 
BHR initiatives can best be characterized.  At the outset, it is important to note that these 
initiatives  operate mainly in a patchwork formula.  Thus, there are a number of different 
multilateral BHR initiatives, which aim to cover a broad range of issues and which cover issues 
                                                 
20 Chinkin, n 17 above, 851. 
21 Abbott and Snidal, n 19 above, 421. 
22 Chinkin, n 17 above, 859; Reisman (1988), n 16 above, 373 (referring to this as control intention). 
23 Reisman (1988), n 16 above, 373. 
24 ibid. 374. 
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already covered by different institutions in addition to a lesser number of issue-specific 
initiatives.25  As a result, the area lacks an overarching governance framework. 
 
1. Leading Multilateral BHR Initiatives 
 
Initiatives to delineate BHR obligations began in the late 20th century as part of an effort by 
developing countries to control the actions of multinational corporations (MNCs).26  Although 
these efforts were mainly in vain, they prompted OECD countries to promulgate their own 
initiative as a way to counter the actions of developing countries.27 This led to a series of 
guidelines, which later became known as the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises.28 
The OECD Guidelines consisted of broad, non-binding standards and practices for corporations 
to make positive contributions to economic and social progress.29   
Efforts to impose constraints on corporate actions in the area of labour followed shortly 
thereafter after and in 1978 the International Labour Organization introduced the Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy.30 The 
Tripartite Declaration provided voluntary standards for corporate practices in relation to a wide 
range of labour issues.  
In 1988, the United Nations made a concerted effort to address business and human 
rights problems by constituting a working group to explore the activities of MNCs.31  These 
                                                 
25 See, e.g. United Nations, Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of 
Restrictive Business Practices G.A. Res. 35/63, U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 48) U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1980), 123; 
World Health Organization, International Code of Marketing of Breast-milk Substitutes (1981).   
26 H. Keller, ‘Codes of Conduct and their Implementation: The Question of Legitimacy’ in R. Wölfrum and V. 
Röben (eds) Legitimacy in International Law (Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2008), 223. 
27 This included attempts to draft the United Nations Draft Code of Conduct for Transnational Corporations and 
to foster a New International Economic Order, which emphasized the need to regulate MNCs. 
28 OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (2011).   
29 ibid. para. 2. and 8. 
30International Labour Organization, Tripartite Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises 
and Social Policy (1978) 17 I.L.M. 422. 
31 D. Weissbrodt and M. Kruger, ‘Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard To Human Rights’ (2003) 97 AJIL 901, 903-905. 
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efforts produced the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (“UN Norms”), a draft code of conduct for 
regulating MNC conduct.32  The U.N. Norms became the first non-voluntary initiative to detail 
BHR obligations, although due in part to business opposition, they were ultimately not 
adopted.33 
Instead, the U.N. went on to enact the Global Compact, a policy initiative that advocates 
good corporate practices in several areas, including human rights.34  Unlike the U.N. Norms, 
the Global Compact was, and continues to be, widely accepted by business, although it lacks 
binding standards or a monitoring mechanism.35  
In 2005, the UN Human Rights Council continued work in this area by appointing a 
Special Representative, John Ruggie, to examine BHR issues in greater detail.36 His findings 
established the “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework wherein he concluded that 
responsibility for BHR issues rested on three differentiated but complementary pillars.37 These 
included the state duty to protect against human rights abuses; the corporate responsibility to 
respect human rights; and the need for more effective access by victims to remedies.  
After a further three years of examination, Ruggie elaborated on the three different 
pillars of responsibility and ultimately produced the UNGPs on Business and Human Rights 
(UNGPs).38  In particular, in relation to the issue of corporate responsibility for human rights, 
                                                 
32 UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of 
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (2003) 
(E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2). 
33 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Responsibilities of transnational corporations and related 
business enterprises with regard to human rights (2004) (E/CN.4/DEC/2004/116) 
34 See A. Rasche, ‘A Necessary Supplement – What the United Nations Global Compact Is and Is Not’ (2009) 
48:4 Business Society 511. 
35ibid. 
36 UN Commission on Human Rights, Human rights and transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises -  Human Rights Resolution 2005/69 (2005) (E/CN.4/RES/2005/69), para. 1. 
37 U.N. Human Rights Council, Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and Human Rights  - 
Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the issue of human rights and transnational 
corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008). 
38 U.N. Human Rights Council, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United 
Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, HR/PUB/11/04 (2011). 
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he concluded that corporations should refrain from infringing on the human rights of others as 
well as “address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved”.39 Moreover, he 
advised that corporations should not cause or contribute “to adverse human rights impacts 
through their own activities” and should “prevent or mitigate adverse human rights impacts 
that are directly linked to their operations” by engaging in a process of human rights due 
diligence.40 Today the UNGPs reflect the latest international standard for corporate 
responsibility. 
Therefore, the global governance framework for BHR issues at the present consists 
primarily of four initiatives.  These are the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 
the ILO Tripartite Declaration, the UN Global Compact, and the UNGPs. 
 
2. Locating BHR initiatives on the soft to hard law continuum 
 
At first glance, it seems prudent to characterize the existing global governance framework for 
BHR issues as soft law given that all the leading international initiatives are voluntary and non-
binding. However, the primary criteria used to distinguish soft from hard law – that is, whether 
obligations are binding, the degree of precision associated with the obligations and with the 
legal consequences of performance and breach, whether there has been a delegation of the 
interpretation of the obligations to a third party, and the level of authority of the drafter – 
suggests that at least some of these initiatives bear characteristics traditionally associated with 
hard law.   
For example, despite the non-binding nature of the OECD Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises, they contain characteristics associated with hard law. In addition to having the 
authority of the OECD behind them – an international organization composed of 39 member 
                                                 
39 ibid. at Guiding Principle 11. 
40 ibid. at Guiding Principle 13; UN Human Rights Council, n 37 above, para. 25 and para. 56-64. 
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states responsible for 80 percent of the world’s trade and investment and specializing in the 
promotion of global economic and social well-being  – the OECD Guidelines contain a degree 
of precision in detailing the standards of conduct corporations should bear. For instance, the 
Guidelines recommend that corporations ‘provide for or co-operate through legitimate 
processes in the remediation of adverse human rights impacts’ caused by the corporation, but 
they do not define ‘legitimate process’.41 The OECD Guidelines also delegate their 
interpretation to third parties or reviewing bodies set up in individual countries known as 
National Contact Points and these bodies further delineate the consequences of breach of the 
OECD Guidelines as they are tasked with enforcement as well.42  However, the National 
Contact Points cannot impose any binding consequences on corporations for breach of the 
Guidelines and their overall efficacy as a reviewing or accountability body for the OECD 
Guidelines has been questioned by commentators.43 Still, despite containing some hard law 
characteristics, the OECD Guidelines seemingly occupy a position away from pure soft law. 
Similarly, the ILO Tripartite Declaration, another non-binding initiative, employs 
characteristics associated with hard law.  Promulgated under the authority of the ILO – a long-
standing UN agency with 187 member states that provides authoritative expertise on labour 
issues – the Tripartite Declaration details with precision the standards expected by corporations 
with regards to labour and employment issues. Thus, it details policies on employment 
promotion, child and forced labour, safety and health standards as well as policies on a host of 
other employment and labour issues.  Moreover, the ILO delegates the interpretation of the 
ILO Tripartite Declaration to the Officers of the Committee on Multinational Enterprises44 as 
                                                 
41OECD Guidelines, n 28 above, chap. IV(6) and Commentary, para. 46.  
42 OECD, ‘National Contact Points for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’. 
43 J. L. Cernic, ‘Corporate Responsibility for Human Rights: A Critical Analysis of the OECD Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises’ (Sept 2008) 3:1 Hanse LR 71; O. de Schutter, Transnational Corporations and Human 
Rights (Oxford: Hart, 2006), 8-9. 
44 Governing Body of ILO, Procedure for the Examination of Disputes concerning the Application of the Tripartite 
Declaration of Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy by Means of Interpretation of 
its Provisions (March 1986). 
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well as imposes reporting obligations on governments.45  However, the ILO Tripartite 
Declaration neither specifies the consequences of breach of its provisions nor specifies any 
type of enforcement vehicle.46 Thus, it contains fewer characteristics associated with hard law 
than the OECD Guidelines, but still remains far from pure soft law due to the ILO Tripartite 
Declaration’s precision of obligations and third-party delegation of its interpretation along with 
the ILO’s considerable authority and expertise on employment and labour issues. 
Conversely, the UN Global Compact is much closer to occupying a position of pure 
soft law.  In addition to being voluntary in nature, the UN Global Compact delineates its 
standards for corporate conduct in only ten, vaguely worded principles.47  For instance, the UN 
Global Compact sums up anti-bribery and corruption responsibilities in one principle requiring 
businesses to “work against corruption in all its forms, including extortion and bribery”.48 
Conversely the OECD Guidelines prohibit bribery and corruption in seven detailed principles 
followed by a seven paragraph commentary delineating the scope of those principles.49  The 
UN Global Compact also fails to specify the consequences of its breach and does not provide 
any third party oversight over its principles. Corporate members are, however, required to file 
annual communication on progress reports and risk dismissal from the UN Global Compact for 
failure to do so.50 Still, despite the authority of the United Nations behind it, given the UN 
Global Compact’s lack of precision in detailing corporate standards or consequences of breach 
of those standards; its lack of monitoring, or third party oversight; and its voluntary nature, the 
UN Global Compact is likely the most cogent example of pure soft law in the BHR arena. 
                                                 
45 For a full overview of the process see de Schutter, n 43 above, 6-8. 
46 O. Amao, Corporate Social Responsibility, Human Rights and the Law: Multinational Corporations in 
Developing Countries, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011), 30. 
47 D. Weissbrodt, ‘Businesss and Human Rights’ (2005) 74 University of Cincinnati Law Review 55, 66; S. Deva, 
‘Global Compact: A Critique of UN's Public-Private Partnership for Promoting Corporate Citizenship’ (2006) 34 
Syracuse J. Int’l L. & Comm. 107, 129. 
48 UN Global Compact, Principle 10. 
49 OECD Guidelines, n 28 above, 47-50. 
50 UN Global Compact, ‘The Communication on Progress (COP) in Brief’. 
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Finally, characterizing the UNGPs, the most current, and arguably the most influential, 
BHR initiative as soft or hard law proves rather more difficult.  This is primarily because the 
UNGPs were grounded deliberately by Ruggie in social, rather than legal, norms.51  Ruggie 
noted that business responsibility for human rights was soft-law oriented, in part, because it 
was derived from social norms or expectations.52 The UNGPs thus purposely frame the 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights as a ‘responsibility’, not as a legal obligation, 
and therefore not as hard law.53 Consequently, characterizing the UNGPs necessarily begins at 
a point away from hard law in order to conform to their drafter’s intent. 
Apart from their deliberate grounding in non-legal norms, the UNGPs also naturally 
position themselves away from hard law, despite the considerable authority of both the UN 
Human Rights Council and John Ruggie and the fact that the UNGPs were the first business 
and human rights instrument to be unanimously approved by the UN Human Rights Council.54 
One of the main reasons for the UNGPs tilt towards soft law is a result of its failure to specify 
the meaning of the “corporate responsibility to respect”. Compare, for instance, the UN Norms, 
which provided detailed and specific corporate obligations in relation to a variety of rights 
including human rights, the rights of workers, consumer protection and environmental 
protection.55  While a subsequently drafted interpretive guide has later managed to elaborate 
somewhat on the corporate responsibility in the UNGPs, the notion is still far less precise than 
what is found in the UN Norms.56 
                                                 
51 UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner on human rights on the 
responsibilities of transnational corporations and related business enterprises with regard to human rights—
business and human rights: towards operationalizing the ‘protect, respect and remedy’ framework (2009) 
(A/HRC/11/13), para. 46. 
52 ibid. para. 46. 
53 ibid. para. 58 and para. 62. 
54 UN Human Rights Council Res. 17/4, U.N. DOC. A/HRC/17/L.17/Rev.1 (June 15, 2011). 
55 UN Norms, n 32 above, para. 2-14. 
56 OHCHR, The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights: An Interpretive Guide (Geneva, United 
Nations 2012). 
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The UNGPs also do not specify the consequences of a breach of the corporate 
responsibility to respect or involve any third party oversight.  Instead, they recommend that 
states take primary responsibility for adjudicating failures of corporate responsibility to respect 
or, alternatively, suggest that corporations or industry create mechanisms for adjudicating such 
failures.57  The UNGPs even recognize that there are gaps or limitations in access to effective 
remedy mechanisms for victims of the failure of the corporate responsibility to respect human 
rights, but still do not provide a monitoring or enforcement mechanism which would oversee 
the espoused conduct in the UNGPs.58 As a result, despite the considerable authority of the UN 
Human Rights Council, the relative lack of preciseness in both the content and enforcement of 
the UNGPs combined with its non-binding nature and its lack of third party oversight position 
the UNGPs much closer to soft law than hard law. 
Thus, despite the non-binding nature of each of the above-mentioned initiatives, they 
are not equivalent in terms of their soft law nature.  Clearly, the UN Global Compact, without 
its precise obligations or specification of the consequences of breach and its lack of third party 
oversight, is softer than the OECD Guidelines, which possesses variants of all of those 
characteristics.  Meanwhile, the ILO Tripartite Declaration and the UNGPs lie somewhere 
between those two initiatives on a continuum between soft and hard law.  By providing a type 
of third party oversight, the ILO Tripartite Declaration is likely positioned closer to the hard 
law end of the continuum, where the OECD Guidelines lie. Conversely, the UNGPs are likely 
located closer to the soft law end, which is anchored by the UN Global Compact.  This is a 
result of the UNGPs’ lack of consequences for breaches and lack of third party oversight, even 
though it contains infinite more elements of each of these elements of hard law than the UN 
Global Compact.  
                                                 
57 UN Human Rights Council, n 38 above, para. 82-101. 
58 ibid. para. 103. 
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Nevertheless, none of these initiatives – not even those possessing several 
characteristics traditionally associated with hard law– could be confused with binding, legal 
obligations. However, as the OECD Guidelines, in particular, demonstrate, by adopting some 
characteristics traditionally associated with hard law BHR initiatives can gravitate closer to the 
hard law end of the continuum. As a result, if an argument exists that BHR initiatives should 
be ‘hardened’ or moved closer to mandatory obligations, the adoption of characteristics 
associated with hard law opens the possibility of strengthening BHR initiatives without 
adopting binding, legal obligations. 
 
II. Hardening business and human right initiatives 
 
As BHR initiatives occupy numerous different positions on a soft to hard law continuum, this 
section examines whether future BHR initiatives should move closer to the hard law end of the 
continuum. As the practice of the states attempting to draft a binding business and human rights 
treaty indicates, the ultimate objective of shifting BHR initiatives along the soft to hard law 
continuum is ‘the creation of direct international law obligations for corporations regarding 
their human rights accountability’.59  The question thus arises whether establishing new norms 
for corporations vis-à-vis human rights is better achieved through soft or hard law. 
 
A. Choosing between soft and hard law 
 
Soft law bears a number of different advantages.  For one, it is more flexible than hard law as 
it grants governments the room to manoeuvre and can make it easier for them to respond to 
                                                 
59 C. Good, ‘Mission Creeps: The (Unintended) Re-enforcement of the Actor’s Discussion in International Law 
through the Expansion of Soft Law Instruments in the business and Human Rights Nexus’ in Lagoutte et al., n 
11 above, 266. 
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problems or changing circumstances on an as needed basis.60 In particular, for areas which are 
developing or changing quickly, soft law instruments are particularly useful as they can be 
adopted rapidly and easily changed. Their utility is especially high for areas which are marked 
by a lack of consensus or for areas in which governments are reluctant to make binding 
commitments.61  Soft law can further be used to overcome inter-state deadlocks62 or act as a 
compromise between governments that cannot agree on the extent of regulatory control that a 
particular area warrants.63 
Soft law can also be advantageous in the sense that it is not law in its traditional sense 
− in that it is not subject to the normal processes that must be complied with to enact law − but 
it still may be able to influence conduct in a desired manner despite its non-legal status.64 In 
this sense, soft law may be preferable to ‘no law’ or to a binding instrument with “diluted and 
vague provisions”.65  Soft law is also a tool for coordination of behaviour between actors, which 
it does by fostering dominant norms.66 Soft law serves to shape and share values as well as to 
create a standard of expectations. It can mould both the acts of governments and those of non-
state actors, such as corporations, as well.67 
Soft law further lowers contracting costs. With non-soft law instruments, negotiation 
and drafting costs are increased as are the approval and ratification process.68  The costs of 
                                                 
60 Chinkin, n 17 above, 852; Shelton, n 10 above, 322; Abbott and Snidal, n 19 above, 423; A. Newman and D. 
Bach, ‘The European Union as Hardening Agent: Soft Law and the Diffusion of Global Financial Regulation’ 
(2014) 21:3 Journal of European Public Policy 430. 
61 Shelton, n 10 above, 322; Abbott and Snidal, n 19 above, 423. 
62J. Gold, ‘Strengthening the Soft International Law of Exchange Arrangements’ (1983) 77 AJIL 443; J.J. Kirton 
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acceding sovereignty in more legalized instruments also tend to be higher, particularly in 
multilateral instruments.69 
Finally, soft law can act as a complement to hard law. It is frequently used to help codify 
the norms in an area or to supplement existing hard law.70 In this latter function, it can resolve 
ambiguities, provide detailed rules or technical standards necessary for interpretation, or fill 
voids.71  In a wider sense, it can also help set a framework for the regulation of behaviour that 
can assist with the negotiation of disputes.72 Indeed, because soft law works towards creating 
a framework, it naturally has informative and educative functions as well. Consequently it is 
well suited to acting as a guide for self-regulation of those its behaviour it seeks to influence, 
particularly if monitoring bodies provide assistance for this role.73 
On the other hand, there are also many instances where legalization, or hard law, is 
preferable. Legalization enables states to signal the credibility of their commitments and this 
is particularly important when coordination or cooperation between states is necessary.74 It can 
also address problems of incomplete contracting by creating mechanisms to interpret parties’ 
commitments.75  Hard law further prevents states from engaging in opportunistic behaviour or 
from reneging on its commitments, both of which serve to enhance the credibility of its 
commitments.76 In addition, it can enhance the enforcement of a state’s commitments, 
especially if interpretation of the law in question is delegated to a third party.77  Delegation also 
prevents self-interpretation of the instrument, which again prevents opportunistic behaviour.78 
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Finally, hard law can enhance the legitimacy of an obligation, which, in turn, can act as 
a “compliance pull”.79 Compliance may even be heightened because of the discourse that 
legalization requires: an emphasis of rules and facts over interests and precedents, which 
naturally constrains state action.80 
Based on these advantages, commentators recommend reliance on hard law when ‘the 
benefits of cooperation are great but the potential for opportunism and its costs are high’, 
including when violations from commitments can impose externalities on others.81  Hard law 
is also recommended when non-compliance is difficult to detect or to circumvent problems of 
incomplete contracting by delegating these issues to a third party tribunal to correct.82  
However, relying on hard law may result in significant costs in that it constrains state behaviour 
and their sovereignty.83 Hard law requires greater precision in outlining obligations.  This can 
lead to excessive rigidity or the prevention of any consensus among the parties at all.84 In areas 
where coordination or collaboration are needed, hard law is thought to be ineffective because 
it commands and controls instead of allowing flexible, bottom-up governance.85 
Conversely, soft law is preferable in areas where it is necessary to counter high 
contracting costs, particularly in relation to sovereignty costs, which are raised when external 
authority is exerted over issues of particular concern or interfere with state-citizen relations or 
when issues are new and complex.86  Nevertheless, the continuum between soft and hard law 
is confirmed by the fact that relaxing one or more elements of legalization – the binding nature 
of the obligations, the precision of the obligations, or the delegation to external authorities – 
will result in soft law.87 
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B. Should BHR initiatives be soft or hard? 
 
From the review of the advantages of soft and hard law, it appears, at first glance, that BHR 
initiatives should be composed of mainly hard law obligations. Since legalization acts as a 
compliance pull and it is particularly useful in areas where violations from commitments can 
impose externalities on others or where non-compliance is difficult to detect, the very nature 
of BHR issues suggests a need for hard law.  BHR involves a high risk of imposing severe 
externalities onto others, as both the Bhopal disaster88 and the Rana Plaza disaster89 
demonstrate.  It is also an area where non-compliance may be difficult to detect, particularly if 
victims fear the power of the offending corporation.  Thus, it would benefit from mechanisms 
which induce compliance. 
However, BHR is also an area which is developing and which faces potentially high 
sovereignty costs if international external authority were to be exercised over the issues.  It is 
also an area notable for being one in which governments are reluctant to make binding 
commitments. Because of these factors, contracting costs in the area of BHR are very high. 
Moreover, the BHR arena is generally reflective of an area plagued by a lack of 
consensus or political will.  Corporations do not agree on the extent of their responsibilities on 
this issue and, accordingly, governments – which may be beholden to the interests of 
corporations – do not agree on the responsibility that should be imposed on these entities.  This 
lack of consensus is further complicated by the uncertainty of the status of corporations under 
international law.90  While states are considered subjects of international law, and therefore 
bear clear human rights obligations under international law, corporations are not necessarily 
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viewed as having the same status. This leaves open the question as to whether international law 
can impose human rights obligations on these entities.91  
Given the lack of consensus between states on the extent of corporate responsibilities 
for human rights, it is likely that the law’s uncertainty as to whether corporations should legally 
bear responsibilities for these issues will remain. This, combined with the potentially high 
sovereignty and contracting costs suggests that a soft law governance approach may be more 
appropriate. 
In fact, relying on a soft law governance framework for BHR issues is supported by its 
pervasive use in other areas of the law. Ranging from environmental law92 to anti-bribery law93 
to nuclear non-proliferation94 to multilateral arms control,95 soft law is being increasingly relied 
upon as a source of norm guidance. In some areas, the increased usage of soft law results from 
its use as tool to act as a precursor to hard law with the ultimate goal being the conclusion of a 
binding international treaty.96 
However, in other areas, soft law is being used not as an ends to a mean but rather as a 
valuable tool in its own right.  For instance, corporate governance in most states is now subject 
to soft law or voluntary standards. Indeed, not only are many of the corporate governance 
standards voluntary, but the standards themselves are also focused on the process rather than 
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the issues.97 Thus, governments do not regulate the gender composition of boards, they merely 
recommend that companies disclose the gender of board members.98 Corporations are also not 
required to adhere to the recommended standards or processes and can, instead, ‘explain’ why 
they have chosen not to comply with the standard in question.99   
Similarly, soft law is being used in the area of international financial regulation as a 
valuable tool in and of itself.100 For financial and securities regulation issues, soft law is even 
viewed as a superior solution because of the dynamism of this continually evolving issue 
area.101 In these areas, soft law is valued for both creating leeway for adaptability to individual 
circumstances and for limiting encroachment on sovereign authority.102  In international 
financial regulation, soft law is even viewed as essential because it facilitates low-cost 
collaboration, drives “a collective approach to international engagement” and allows 
governments to “tackle complex, quickly evolving global problems that cannot be addressed 
unilaterally”.103  
As the examples from corporate governance and international financial regulation 
suggest, soft law can operate as an effective governance tool in its own right. Given the lack of 
political consensus in the BHR arena, soft law may therefore make a substantial contribution 
to designing the appropriate regulatory framework for BHR issues. 
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III. Soft Law as a Regulatory Framework for BHR Initiatives 
 
While the UNGPs, as the latest representation of BHR initiatives, demonstrate the continued 
dominance of soft law in this area, they also indicate the trajectories soft law may be taking. 
From one perspective, soft law BHR initiatives, and the UNGPs in particular, can be viewed 
as a precursor to a binding treaty. That is, soft law in this context is being used as a preparatory 
step ‘to the exclusively intergovernmental process of ‘hardening’ norms’ by way of an 
international treaty.104  However, soft law may also being used to manage and optimize ‘the 
existing regulative system’.105 Under this approach, the ultimate goal is not necessarily a ‘hard’ 
norm, but rather a broad regulative framework which assumes ‘a clear governance role’.106   
The author of the UNGPs, John Ruggie, seems to favour the latter view noting that the 
UNGPs represent a ‘common global platform for action’ and ‘a single, logically coherent and 
comprehensive template’ within which ‘the implications of existing standards and practices’ 
can be detailed.107 Moreover, for Ruggie, who intended the UNGPs to represent the basis ‘from 
which thinking and action of all stakeholders…generate cumulative progress over time’,108 the 
UNGPs, and similar soft law initiatives, encompass a broad remit of regulatory approaches, of 
which hard law might, but need not be an option.  In other words, BHR soft law initiatives are 
being used as a coordination tool109 by fostering dominant norms, creating a standard of 
expectations110 for both states and business as well as establishing a framework for the 
regulation of behaviour that has both informative and educative functions.111  
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Such standards of expectations can be understood through the transmission of the same 
‘message’ through different international bodies.112 Thus, the ‘baseline expectation’ that 
corporations should respect human rights and the corresponding responsibility to engage in 
human rights due diligence, espoused in the UNGPs, is replicated in the OECD Guidelines,113 
the UN Global Compact,114 and the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ 
general comment,115 among other places. Changes to the understanding of the standards of 
expectations are similarly reflected through repetitions of the same message in different bodies.  
For example, the UNGPs establishment of the corporate responsibility to respect shifted the 
language of the OECD Guidelines from merely encouraging corporations to respect human 
rights116 to recommending that they ‘avoid causing or contributing to adverse human rights 
impacts’ and engage in human rights due diligence.117 
Still ultimately, soft law, in whatever its form, is being used in the area of BHR to 
establish norms for corporations regarding their human rights accountability. However, by 
operating through a soft law approach it suffers from two principal risks. The first is non-
compliance altogether and the second is that corporations may engage in symbolic compliance 
but fail to change their underlying approach to the issue at hand.118  Consequently, soft law’s 
effectiveness depends crucially on its enforcement.119  
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If soft law is used only as an interim step to developing a binding treaty or covenant, 
such risks are minimal as enforcement will ultimately be included within such an instrument.  
However, if as the UNGPs seem to signal, soft law will be used as part of a broader regulatory 
framework, such risks need to be minimized, for instance, by incorporating characteristics of 
hard law as a means of enforcing soft law.  Principally this is because the UNGPs, and the other 
BHR initiatives do not represent any new obligations for businesses, but rather crystallize 
existing duties.120 Thus, without enforcing soft law BHR initiatives, they only ‘give the 
illusion’ of moving business responsibilities in the area beyond a voluntary standard, while in 
truth they remain strictly within the voluntary realm.121 
  
A. ‘Enforcing’ soft law 
 
One approach to enforcing soft law, such that it can be gradually moved from the voluntary to 
the mandatory is to increase the specificity of soft law commitments. For instance, in 
international financial regulation parties make specific commitments as to the behaviour they 
will or will not engage in and these commitments are elaborated upon in memorandums of 
understanding, codes of conducts or best practices.122 Regulators further make efforts to ensure 
commitments are affirmative rather than negative commitments, thereby requiring parties to 
engage rather than refrain from activity.123  Similarly, in areas where regulation focuses only 
on processes, the standards for those processes need to be specified.124  
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More importantly, to be effective soft law instruments should be monitored and 
enforced, particularly by an entity outside the corporation.125 Monitoring and enforcement can 
arise from several different, and often complementary, sources.  For instance, international 
organizations, such as the IMF and World Bank, impose sanctions for failures to adhere to soft 
law in international financial regulation.126 Similarly, lending institutions monitor social and 
environmental risk related to project finance under the Equator Principles.127 Multi-stakeholder 
initiatives have also proved effective as monitors and enforcers on corporate conduct in a 
diverse range of industries ranging from forestry to food and beverage to apparel to marine 
fisheries.128 In particular, these initiatives have often transformed the ‘greenwashing’ practices 
of corporate self-regulatory approaches by providing verification and independent 
monitoring.129  
Likely the most well-known monitor of corporate conduct, though, are NGOs.  Not 
only do NGOs monitor corporate conduct but they may be instrumental in enforcing violations 
against them as well.130 Tactics have involved ‘naming and shaming’ as well as enforcing codes 
of conduct or engaging in other forms of litigation.131  The practice of ‘naming and shaming’ 
as a form of enforcement is also practiced in the areas of international financial regulation by 
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the intergovernmental organization, the Financial Action Task Force.132  The Task Force 
identifies states and regulators that do not adhere to anti-money laundering policies and creates 
a public blacklist that is shared with the public and with domestic financial institutions.  The 
aim is to shame states into compliance by heightening the “reputational consequences of non-
observance”.133 
 
B. Shifting Soft Law BHR initiatives Along the Continnum 
 
In order to use soft law to establish norms for corporations in this area−but ones that move 
closer to the mandatory than the voluntary realm−one approach would be to introduce some 
form of monitoring since independent monitoring produces a form of oversight that encourages 
accountability. Indeed one of the reasons for the creation of the UNGPs was because 
corporations often operate in states without human rights obligations or they fail to enforce 
them.134 These lacunae created governance gaps within which corporations could engage in 
their activities – including human rights abuses – with impunity. Monitoring by independent 
third parties135 would help close these governance gaps by ensuring that states enact and/or 
enforce human rights obligations that would prevent corporate misconduct.136  
Alternatively, monitoring could be accomplished through a Business and Human 
Rights Task Force, which operates in similar fashion to the Financial Action Task Force in 
international financial regulation. The BHR Task Force would be tasked with ‘shaming’ states 
who did not implement the UNGPs or other current BHR principles by blacklisting them on 
markets. This could be done by coordinating with national stock exchanges and either 
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informing the exchange of non-compliance or by conditioning listing on the exchange on a 
non-blacklisted status from the BHR Task Force. The Shenzhen Stock Exchange already 
requires corporations to establish a social responsibility mechanism and to disclose social 
responsibility matters as a listing condition, suggesting that some stock exchanges may be 
amenable to similar proposals.137  
Soft law BHR initiatives could also be enforced by helping to foster their compliance, 
for instance, by clarifying the legal obligations that underlie business responsibilities for human 
rights.138  As these are unclear at the moment and, at least in relation to the UNGPs rooted in 
social rather than legal norms, it makes it considerably more difficult to convince corporations 
of their responsibilities in this area when the responsibilities appear only to be more moral in 
nature. Indeed, as Lagoutte has observed, the UNGPs do not clarify ‘the authoritative 
dimension of human rights in business’ thereby distancing the notion of corporations actually 
bearing human rights obligations.139 Clarification of such an authoritative dimension may 
therefore be critical. Similarly, the provisions within existing business and human rights 
initiatives could also be clarified. The UN Global Compact, for instance, could elaborate on its 
ten principles and be more specific in terms of the desired corporate conduct while the UNGPs 
would benefit from greater precision both in terms of its substantive obligations, but also in 
terms of what specifically is expected from corporations in relation to their human rights due 
diligence responsibilities 
Third, the enforceability of soft law initiatives could be improved by marrying them 
with provisions in treaties with enforceable obligations. For instance, international investment 
agreements are now increasingly incorporating BHR issues into their ambit.  Thus the 
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Morocco-Nigeria bilateral investment treaty (BIT) specifies that corporations ‘shall uphold 
human rights’ while the Brazil-Malawi BIT bilateral investment treaty requires investors to 
develop “best efforts” to, among other obligations, respect the human rights of those involved 
in the companies’ activities and apply effective self-regulatory practices and management 
systems that foster trust between companies and society.140 Since international investment 
agreements generally allow for the enforcement of treaty obligations through binding 
arbitration, access to dispute resolution for investors could be conditioned on fulfilment of 
BHR treaty obligations. 
Finally, the enforceability of soft law norms in this area could be improved by 
establishing legal consequences for breach of these norms, principally by providing remedies 
to victims. The United Nations Working Group on Access to Remedies has suggested that such 
remedies be available in a ‘diverse’ range of settings both at state and corporate levels.141 
Corporations could thus be held accountable through judicial forums, both at the national or 
international level, or through non-judicial mechanisms such as by way of inter-state 
memorandums of understanding addressing such issues – such as the practice between Sweden 
and China – or by way of corporate grievance mechanisms.142 Providing adequate remedies in 
this area could further by detailing consequences for corporate breach the aim would be 
increase the enforceability of the soft law provisions.  
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IV.  SHIFTING TO HARD LAW 
 
While the lack of political consensus in the area of BHR has confined it to essentially soft law 
instruments− albeit with the need for at least some characteristics of hard law − the 
predominance of soft law BHR instruments does not suggest that future initiatives should 
similarly be corralled into soft law instruments only. The difficulty in securing full corporate 
compliance for the respect or protection of human rights as well as the governance gaps within 
which corporations can operate with impunity support the necessity of binding legal 
obligations. Even John Ruggie, who advocated in favour of a soft law approach for the UNGPs, 
has supported the notion of a binding BHR instrument for areas where specific governance 
gaps exist and which are not touched by other means, such as in relation to gross human rights 
violations.143  Thus, even if soft law initiatives with characteristics of hard law are successful, 
in at least some aspects of BHR, further legalized options are warranted. 
This part examines ongoing efforts to conclude legalized BHR instruments, first at the 
international level and then at the domestic level, before moving to assess which approaches 
would be most fruitful for future BHR initiatives. 
A. International Initiatives 
 
Since June 2014 several states have begun the arduous task of concluding a binding BHR 
instrument.144 The reasons for concluding such an instrument are myriad and include: covering 
governance gaps where states do not enact or do not enforce measures to protect human rights, 
acting as a central source within which the responsibilities of corporations can be outlined, 
transforming the UNGPs into binding obligations, ensuring that all corporations – regardless 
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of location – adhere to the same set of human rights standards and increasing access to effective 
remedies to human rights victims.145  The working group currently heading the negotiations 
hopes to achieve these and many more outcomes, including specifying a wide range of human 
rights for which corporations would be responsible.146 
However, creating an overarching binding legal framework for BHR issues poses some 
risks.  Notably, including a broad range of human rights in the instrument risks attenuating the 
rights in order to secure the necessary state approval.147  Equally problematic is the lack of 
global support for the binding instrument. At present, several states, home to some of the largest 
multinational corporations, do not support the initiation of a BHR treaty and are therefore not 
participating in the negotiation of this instrument.148  Without support from these states, many 
of the largest multinational corporations will not fall under the jurisdiction of the binding 
instrument perpetuating existing governance gaps.  It is thus unclear whether pursuit of a 
binding BHR instrument without support from so many key states will significantly progress 
protection of human rights victims at the hands of corporations or whether the instrument will 
face the same fate as the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant 
workers and their Families,149 which after 25 years has only been ratified by 48 states, most of 
which are migrant-sending states.150 
Conversely, a hardening of BHR obligations may be easier if the scope of the 
instrument is narrowed or is made more precise. John Ruggie has termed such binding 
instruments as ‘precision tools’ which focus only on specific issues.151  A good example of 
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such a precise tool is the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FWCTC), which 
codifies state obligations with the aim of addressing the causes of the globalization of the 
tobacco epidemic.152 Although the FWCTC is addressed to state parties, the treaty also 
regulates the conduct of tobacco companies through provisions regulating the contents, product 
disclosures, packaging and labelling, and advertising of tobacco products.153  The FWCTC 
boasts an impressive 180 state parties, including several states which are opposed to the binding 
business and human rights instrument mentioned above.  
The FWCTC was not initially conceived as a binding instrument.  Instead, it was drafted 
as a framework designed to establish a general system of governance for tobacco products, but 
without specifying any detailed obligations.154 Once the framework was established, protocols 
– or separate legally binding agreements – could then be adopted, either concurrently or 
subsequently, which would then detail the specific obligations needed to further the goals in 
the framework.155 The purpose of such a two-step approach was to gather the necessary 
political consensus on the issue that a one-step jump to an international binding treaty might 
not be able to achieve.156 However, the final version of the FWCTC emerged as much more 
than a general system of governance, containing a number of detailed obligations, a result 
which might have deterred parties from being a party to the framework if they had anticipated 
the final outcome.157  
While it is unclear whether the treaty has curbed the spread of tobacco usage, it has had 
a noticeable impact on corporate conduct. One study has revealed that the number of health 
warning labels on cigarette packages has increased from 8.42 to 22.33 percent since the treaty 
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was signed, meaning that companies have been required to change their product’s packaging 
and labelling.158 Moreover, in response to regulations required by the Convention, tobacco 
giant, Philip Morris, instigated two investment arbitrations, against the governments of 
Australia and Uruguay, challenging the domestic regulations.159  While the arbitrations were 
both ultimately unsuccessful, the initiation of the arbitrations suggest that the FWCTC has had 
a significant enough effect on corporations such that the legislation it prompted in states was 
worth challenging.160  
The FWCTC process emerges as an interesting alternative to achieving hard law 
obligations for BHR issues.  By focusing at the outset in only establishing a general governance 
framework for tobacco issues, the FWCTC was able to build up the necessary political will to 
ultimately achieve binding obligations.  If BHR issues can be narrowed to a more limited set 
of issues – for instance, by focusing on establishing positive obligations for corporations for 
only the most salient human rights issues – the framework/protocol two-step procedure used 
by the FWCTC may be better able to garner the necessary state support for binding obligations 
than the one-step binding instrument currently being negotiated. 
 
B. Domestic initiatives 
 
Apart from the ongoing negotiations for the binding BHR instrument, efforts are also being 
made at the domestic level to further legalize BHR obligations. In several European states, for 
instance, governments have introduced mandatory reporting obligations for corporations to 
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disclose human rights issues pursuant to an EU directive.161 Companies are thus required to 
disclose human rights policies, outcomes and risks as well as information on human rights due 
diligence processes implemented by the company.162 Similarly, in Denmark, corporations must 
adhere to both the EU directive requirements as well as expressly discuss their human rights 
reduction actions, regardless of whether they are already included in their CSR policies.163 
However, France, has progressed further than mere reporting obligations to introduce 
substantive due diligence obligations.  The law, known as the duty of vigilance (“le devoir de 
vigilance”)164 requires corporations to take reasonable care in identifying and preventing risks 
to human rights and fundamental freedoms, serious bodily injury or environmental damage or 
health risks resulting directly or indirectly from the operations of the company.  The viligance 
obligations extend to both the companies it controls as well as to the activities of subcontractors 
or suppliers.165  Corporations will further be required to put into place vigilance plans (“plans 
de vigilance”) that will identify these risks and determine reasonable measures for addressing 
these risks. The law applies to corporations with more than 5000 employees with a registered 
office in France and corporations can face liability for breach of the duty of vigilance.166 
Similar to France’s duty of vigilance, a popular initiative has been introduced in 
Switzerland known as the Swiss Responsible Business Initiative.167 The Swiss Initiative 
imposes a due diligence obligation on Swiss companies to respect human rights and 
environmental standards by obliging companies to identify real and potential impacts on 
internationally recognized human rights and the environment; take appropriate measures to 
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prevent violation of these standards, and account for the actions taken. Moreover, the obligation 
extends to both the parent company as well as any companies it controls – even if located 
outside Switzerland. The Swiss Initiative takes a broad definition of control, encompassing 
both traditional legal definitions of control as well as the exercise of power in a business 
relationship.168 Like the French law, the Swiss Initiative holds companies liable for failure to 
adhere to the delineated obligations unless the company can demonstrate that it took due care, 
for which it bears the onus of proof. Initiated by the people of Switzerland, the Swiss Initiative 
was officially validated by the government in November 2016 and will likely come to a popular 
vote in 2018. 
In the U.K., efforts to harden business and human rights law have also been undertaken 
but in a significantly different manner than the approach taken in France or Switzerland or even 
in the proposed binding BHR instrument.  In 2015, the U.K. government introduced the 
Modern Slavery Act,169 which seeks to combat slavery and human trafficking by requiring 
corporations to prepare annual statements.170 In these annual statements, a corporation must 
declare the steps it has taken to ensure that slavery and human trafficking is not taking place 
either in any of its supply chains or in any part of its own business. Corporations are encouraged 
to reveal, as part of the statement, the nature of their supply chains, their policies on slavery 
and human trafficking, the nature of the due diligence processes they engage in to ascertain 
this information, which aspects of its business and supply chains are at risk of slavery or human 
trafficking and how these risks have been mitigated.171   
However, unlike the French or Swiss approach, enforcement of the obligations found 
in the Modern Slavery Act is not through the judicial process. Instead the annual statements 
are required to be approved and signed by the board of directors and the statement must be 
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posted on the corporation’s website’s homepage.172   Moreover, the Secretary of State has the 
authority to bring an injunction against the corporation in cases of non-compliance.173  While 
experts do not believe that the Secretary of State will exercise its option to bring an injunction, 
it is thought that the government expects stakeholders to pressure non-compliant businesses 
into compliance.174 
Compared to the approaches in France and Switzerland, the Modern Slavery Act is 
much narrower in its coverage and also closer to the soft law end of the continuum than the 
other two approaches. Although it specifies the outcomes of non-compliance, because it is 
commonly known that the most stringent enforcement mechanism will only be rarely used, one 
would expect a high degree of non-compliance by businesses.  However, this has not been the 
case and recent studies have found that companies are making significant progress in 
addressing modern slavery.175  Indeed, because the Modern Slavery Act requires directors to 
sign the annual statement it propels ownership of slavery and human trafficking issues to the 
highest level of the organization and it is likely this ownership by the directors of the issue, 
combined with the possibility of public attention for instances of non-compliance, that ensures 
corporate adherence to Modern Slavery Act standards.176 
At the same time, the French and Swiss approaches offer a much more legalized option 
to ensure corporate adherence to a broad range of human right responsibilities. They offer 
human rights victims a judicialized remedy for a wide range of corporate wrongs – 
encompassing both human rights and environmental issues – and in doing so, provide access 
to an effective remedy required by the third pillar of the UNGPs, a remedy that is rarely found 
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in other jurisdictions. Moreover, by creating a direct cause of action the initiatives ameliorate 
non forum conveniens hurdles which have typically plagued human rights victims who have 
been harmed in jurisdictions without adequate legal recourse and who need to seek redress 
from better capitalized parent corporations.177 Thus, the French and Swiss approaches offer a 
significantly rare and broad mechanism for legal enforcement of corporate responsibilities by 
human rights victims.  
 
C. Moving forward 
 
Introducing binding legal obligations for BHR issues remains an important goal, but as the 
experience with the proposed binding BHR treaty and the Swiss and French initiatives 
indicates, hard law approaches require a deft touch. Without political consensus and the support 
of business, binding BHR obligations – even if implemented – are unlikely to make the 
necessary normative changes that will truly address BHR problems. A binding global treaty 
that is not ratified by a large preponderance of states or broad-reaching domestic obligations 
that are repeatedly defeated at the legislative level not only leaves the possibility of governance 
gaps, but they also fail to engage state or corporate ownership of BHR issues.  Without this 
type of ownership, hard law approaches are destined to fail. 
Conversely, at the international level, the framework/protocol approach used by the 
FWCTC offers a more pragmatic approach for achieving binding obligations than by directly 
forming an overarching treaty. Because the framework aims to generate general political 
consensus, it allows states to arrive at a consensus on a number of key issues.  This gradual 
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acquiescence process is more likely to result in global commitments from a wide range of states 
than an approach which requires state commitment on a large breadth of issues at the outset.  
Moreover, by allowing political consensus to slowly build up, it also offers an opportunity for 
corporations to, similarly, gradually begin to internalize these issues as well.  This can facilitate 
the necessary corporate acceptance that will ensure such commitments are made at the 
international level by states and not follow the failed path of the UN Norms. 
Moreover, by enacting protocols after the conclusion of the framework, the path is set 
toward the eventual creation of binding obligations. As a result, the framework/protocol 
approach has the potential to further legalize BHR obligations more effectively than existing 
BHR initiatives have managed to do. 
At the same time, domestic initiatives, particularly those with an extraterritorial effect, 
should also be encouraged as they further help to close governance gaps. Yet again, a gradual 
approach may be preferable at the domestic level as well.  By introducing a narrow range of 
non-stringent obligations, the UK’s Modern Slavery Act may be more successful in the long 
run than the more forceful approach adopted by the Swiss and French. This is because, first, it 
requires BHR issues to be considered at board level, and, second, because its requirements are 
narrow in scope, it may be seen as more likely a task that businesses can accomplish.  The 
combined effect of these two reasons is likely to generate more business ‘buy-in’ than broader, 
more stringent obligations. In doing so, this nuanced approach may facilitate business respect 
for at least some BHR issues, and in the long run, may further prompt normative changes at 
the board level that will provide greater recognition of other BHR issues as well. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
A soft law label for BHR initiatives is both accurate and misleading at the same time.  Even 
when these initiatives are non-binding in nature, they can contain elements of hard law, 
suggesting that they are far from creatures of pure soft law.  More importantly, to ensure their 
efficacy, BHR initiatives should incorporate elements of ‘hardness’, particularly by ensuring 
they are accompanied by monitoring and enforcement tools. However, in doing so, they need 
not compromise the advantages they enjoy as soft law initiatives.  As the use of soft law 
initiatives in international finance has demonstrated, effectively structured soft law BHR 
initiatives can be valuable tools, in and of themselves. 
Still, because soft law BHR initiatives – even those accompanied by hard law elements 
– can lead to grave externalities on others when corporations or states deviate from their 
commitments, continued progress should be made towards adopting, at least, some binding 
legal obligations in the area.  At the international level, the framework/protocol approach offers 
an interesting template in order to enable global political consensus to develop on key BHR 
issues. Although it represents a softer approach than the drafting of a binding overarching BHR 
treaty, the framework/protocol approach is likely to garner more widespread state support than 
the proposed treaty.  This is essential to both closing governance gaps and protecting a wider 
range of human rights victims. At the same time, binding domestic initiatives with 
extraterritorial effect should also be encouraged, although such initiatives may need to be 
limited in scope in order to ensure their passage into law. 
Ultimately, the appropriate governance strategy for BHR issues may need to draw from 
both soft and hard law initiatives in order to allow the necessary political consensus on aspects 
of this issue to build while still offering a robust vehicle for protection for victims of corporate 
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irresponsibility.  The soft to hard law continuum thus offers an appropriate spectrum for such 
initiatives.  However, since most existing initiatives tend to be grouped towards the soft law 
end, new initiatives must move farther along the spectrum in order to approximate the right 
mix of soft and hard law.  This is because without at least some movement to the mandatory 
from the voluntary, corporate responsibility for human rights will continue to remain optional, 
a situation which simply cannot continue.  
